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Evaluating the performance of Chinese commercial banks: A comparative
analysis of different types of banks

Abstract
This paper examines the cost and profit efficiency of four types of Chinese commercial banks
over the period from 2002 to 2013. We find that the cost and profit efficiencies improved across
all types of Chinese domestic banks in general and the banks are more profit-efficient than cost
efficient. Foreign banks are the most cost efficient but the least profit efficient. The profit
efficiency gap between foreign banks and domestic banks has widened after the World Trade
Organization transition period (2007-2013). Ownership structure, market competition, bank size,
and listing status are the main determinants of the efficiency of Chinese banks. We also find a
causal relationship between efficiency and SROE by using the panel auto regression method. The
evidence from the shadow return on equity (SROE) suggests that policy makers should be
cautious of the adjustment costs imposed by the recapitalization process, which offsets the
efficiency gains.

Keywords: Finance; Efficiency; Stochastic frontier analysis; Shadow return on equity; Chinese
banking
JEL Code: G21, G28, P34
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Evaluating the performance of Chinese commercial banks: A comparative analysis
of different types of banks
1. Introduction
China’s banking sector has grabbed the attention of international investors and the financial
media in recent years thanks to the opening up of the banking market after China joined the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the enormous strides made in banking reform and
deregulation in the past 15 years. In many regards, Chinese banks seem to have been immune to
the recent global banking epidemic due to their “closed” capital accounts and insulated banking
sector that primarily relies on traditional banking business that is not exposed to risky and
complex financial instruments. However, there are lingering concerns about the fragility of the
Chinese banking system. The close link between stated-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) increases the number of non-performing loans for these banks
and raises concerns about the safety and soundness of the Chinese banking sector. In light of this,
the Chinese government has implemented a series of reforms to transform state-owned banks
from state-dominated bureaucracies into modern market-oriented banking institutions. The
reforms include removing the credit ceiling on deposits and loans, disposing of SOCBs’ nonperforming loans, recapitalizing the SOCBs, encouraging banks to seek a listing on the stock
exchange, introducing management incentives based on efficiency measures, and introducing
foreign strategic investors. While these reforms have had a positive impact on the SOCBs, many
of the problems with state-owned banks are not yet fully resolved. The banks remain relatively
undercapitalized, have high bad-loan ratios, weak corporate governance, and fail to allocate
resources efficiently (Allen et al., 2005; Lin and Zhang, 2009; Jiang et al., 2009).
Many medium and small-sized commercial banks, most notably city commercial banks
(CCBs), have emerged and developed rapidly in the past decade. Unlike the SOCBs, these newly
established banks typically have a lower level of state ownership and their shareholders include
local government, SOEs, private enterprises, foreign strategic investors, and wealthy individuals.
This diversified ownership structure means that CCBs can raise funds from various channels
outside of the state system and they are fully responsible for their own lending policies.
Consequently, their loan portfolios tend to be much stronger than those of the big state-owned
banks. In addition, the medium and small-sized commercial banks have played a very important
role in the development of financial markets and the economy in China. In particular, they are
heavily involved in the financing of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), an area that
will be a key driver of China’s economic growth in the future (Allen et al., 2005) but one where
the state-owned banks have traditionally been weak. Current economic downturns in Europe, the
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U.S., and elsewhere have resulted in significant declines in China’s export growth rates and, as a
result of this, a large number of Chinese SMEs have had to cease operations or have gone
bankrupt due to financing difficulties or breaks in the funding chain. To help mitigate or prevent
this from happening in the future, the smaller banks can provide prompt and effective financing
to SMEs, and this will help China to continue its economic development and help improve social
stability. The Chinese government recently released a policy memorandum that emphasizes the
importance of the CCBs to the financial market and which encourages them to seek listings on
domestic and/or international stock exchanges and expand their business operations to other
regions or cities. Thus, the CCBs are seen as a vital facilitator of economic growth in China and
it is therefore of interest to assess their performance efficiencies over the last twelve years, a
period that has seen the most significant developments in banking.
A number of studies have investigated bank efficiency (or performance) in China (e.g., Chen
et al., 2005; Fu and Heffernan, 2007; Ariff and Can, 2008; Berger et al., 2009; Du and Girma,
2011; Asmild and Matthews, 2012; Dong et al., 2014; Matthews, 2013). However, most of these
studies only focus on analysing the SOCBs and joint stock commercial banks (JSCBs), which are
relatively large and have nationwide business operations1. These studies typically do not consider
the role or importance of small banks (such as CCBs) in the Chinese banking sector. In addition,
the above mentioned studies all employ relatively small samples, which weaken the
generalizability of the research findings.
China has introduced aggressive bank recapitalization programmes over the last twelve years,
with the aim of reducing financial risks and ensuring bank viability. For example, the
government injected 514.8 billion yuan in equity from its foreign exchange reserves into four big
SOCBs during the period 2003-2005. As a more recent example, the Agricultural Bank of China
(a SOCB) received a 130 billion yuan capital injection from a unit of the country's Sovereign
Wealth Fund at the end of 2008. In 2004, the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC)
promulgated new capital rules, mainly based on the Basel II rules, to require Chinese commercial
banks to replenish their capital base to meet a minimum capital adequacy ratio (CAR) of 8% on
or before 2007 2. In addition, the government has encouraged foreign financial institutions to
invest in Chinese domestic banks by taking up to a 25% ownership stake in them. Within the
five-year period between 2004 and 2008, 24 domestic banks acquired fresh capital from 36
foreign partners. The Chinese authorities also encouraged banks to raise new capital by listing
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A study by Zhang et al. (2012) is one of the few exceptions. This article investigates the relations between law enforcement and
technical efficiency using a sample that only includes Chinese CCBs.
2
According to a CBRC spokesman, under the new stricter rules, the CAR of banks decreased by an average of 2% compared to
what they would have been under the previous set of rules formulated in 1995.
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on stock exchanges via an initial public offering (IPO) in last decade3. All these measures were
designed to boost banks’ capital bases and improve the health of the banking sector. However,
recapitalization imposes resource costs on both the economy as a whole and on the banking
system in particular. The impact of the massive recapitalization programme on bank performance
is therefore of interest to bank managers and policy makers alike. Boucinha et al. (2012) and
Duygun et al. (2012) examine the cost of recapitalization by estimating the shadow (or true)
return on equity using an econometric model of banking industry costs, using samples of
Portuguese and Turkish banks, respectively4. However, to the best of our knowledge, no studies
have examined this important issue in the context of the Chinese banking sector. Economies of
scale have important implications for regulators and bank managers in terms of merger and
acquisition issues, but, to date, there is very limited empirical evidence on scale economies in the
Chinese banking sector.
The main purpose of our paper is to provide new evidence on the state of the banking industry
in China. First, we assess both the cost and profit efficiency levels of Chinese banks during the
period following WTO accession, using a comprehensive dataset. By estimating the efficiency
levels of Chinese banks using stochastic frontier analysis (SFA), we examine the impact of the
Chinese banking reforms and compare the performance of CCBs with those of SOCBs, JSCBs,
and foreign banks. Furthermore, we compare the efficiency of CCBs in different regions to
investigate whether inequalities in regional economic development affect performance. The
results provide us with a comprehensive understanding of the different segments of the Chinese
(commercial) banking sector and the impacts of the recent reforms on bank performance.
Second, in order to explore the impact of recapitalization on the Chinese banking sector, we
estimate the shadow return on equity by developing a specification of the frontier cost function
subject to a capitalization constraint. We also explore the relation between the efficiency level
and the shadow return on equity by using a panel vector auto regression (PVAR) framework, The
results are broadly consistent with those from the one stage stochastic frontier approach. Finally,
we investigate scale economies in the Chinese banking sector, the results of which could provide
very useful information for regulatory analysis and for decision makers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background
information relating to the Chinese banking sector. Section 3 reviews the recent literature on
Chinese banking efficiency. Section 4 presents the methodology and data employed in our
empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
3

By the end of 2014, there are 21 Chinese banks listed on domestic stock exchanges and/or the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
Among them, 16 Chinese banks launched IPOs during our sample period 2002-2013.
4
The accounting value, return on equity (ROE), can be used to measure the cost of equity. However, ROE may not be a good
measure because it is volatile and incorporates subjective provisions that are expedient to the bank’s top management at any
particular time.
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2. Institutional background of the Chinese banking sector
Over the last thirty years, China has been one of the world’s fastest-growing emerging
economies and it became the world’s second largest economy in terms of nominal GDP in 2010.
China’s banking sector has played a key role in its economic growth. In order to create a sound
and effective banking system, the Chinese authorities implemented a comprehensive programme
of banking reforms designed to address the institutional, political, and organizational problems
faced by the banking industry. The gradual reforms have created a banking sector in China with
multiple categories of banking institutions, operating in separate market segments with
(generally) clearly delineated functions. According to the banks’ ownership structures and
functions, the CBRC classifies banks as wholly state-owned policy banks, large-scale (stateowned) commercial banks, JSCBs, CCBs, rural commercial banks (RCBs), locally incorporated
foreign banks, and other banking institutions.
A major feature of the Chinese banking sector is that it is dominated by the five largest
SOCBs: the Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), the Bank of China (BOC), the China
Construction Bank, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), and the Bank of
Communications (BOCOM)5. Starting in 2005, the CBRC began to transform these wholly stateowned banks into joint-stock corporations by introducing foreign strategic investors and seeking
listings on stock exchanges. Through this recapitalization process, the banks have diversified
their ownership and are now supposedly operating as profit-making commercial banks with less
government intervention than before6. The market share of the five largest SOCBs has fallen
over the last decade (from 59.31% of the total assets in the banking sector in 2002 to 43.34% at
the end of 2013), while the market share of the other types of commercial banks, such as the
JSCBs and CCBs, have steadily increased. There are currently twelve JSCBs with national
operating licences, representing the second tier of Chinese banks. Because the JSCBs were
established more recently than the SOCBs, they are not burdened with any historical policy
lending (and therefore have fewer non-performing loans) and tend to be more agile and
responsive to market conditions. JSCBs are allowed to offer a wide variety of banking services,
including accepting deposits, extending loans, and providing foreign exchange and international
transaction services. They also regularly finance SMEs, an area in which the state-owned banks
have traditionally been weak.

5

BOCOM used to be classed as a JSCB. However, it is much larger than the other JSCBs, and its shares are owned by a number
of different state-owned entities. Therefore, in 2006, the CBRC redefined it as a SOCB. Thus, it joined the other four big stateowned banks (previously known as “the Big Four”) to form “the Big Five”. For consistency, we treat BOCOM as a SOCB rather
than a JSCB throughout the entire sample period.
6
However, these banks are still majority owned by the central government and thus subject to government policies and influence.
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China’s CCBs have only a short history in China’s banking sector. They were originally
wholly owned or controlled by local government. However, since the turn of the century, they
have gradually been transformed into (private) joint-equity corporations with a more diversified
set of shareholders. CCBs are subject to less state intervention and may have relatively better
corporate governance than the big state-owned banks (Ferri, 2009). By the end of 2013, there
were 144 CCBs in China, valued at RMB 15.18 trillion, with an average annual growth rate of
23.84% over the period from 2002 to 2013, and accounting for 10.03% of the total banking
assets in China. However, CCBs are unevenly distributed across China, having more branches in
the better-developed eastern provinces (such as Zhejiang) than in the less developed western
provinces (such as Ganshu).
Because of their smaller size, the CCBs have struggled to compete with the Big Five and the
JSCBs. However, in recent years, they have made significant progress in upgrading their
operational and managerial capacities, as well as promoting innovative products and
technologies. They have gradually nurtured their own brands and corporate cultures, and have
begun to play a pivotal role in financing the development of small and micro-enterprises and the
consumer finance business. They have identified a clear market niche and developed a strategy
of “staying focused on localities of incorporation, serving small and micro enterprises, [and]
tailoring products and services to seek differentiated competition with large commercial banks”
(CBRC, 2011 p26). Competition with larger banks has resulted in some CCBs being among the
most innovative financial institutions in China. CCBs tend to be concentrated in the cities where
they were founded. Unlike the JSCBs, CCBs were not originally allowed to operate at the
national level, which impeded their potential for expansion. However, since 2006, the
supervisory authorities have gradually relaxed this geographical restriction for those CCBs that
are well managed and have good performance, and over time it is expected that CCBs will
develop beyond their traditional regional role.
One of the milestones in China’s financial liberalization process was its accession to the WTO
in late 2001. Since December 2001, the Chinese government has progressively removed
regulatory constraints and implemented many reforms to open up its banking sector to foreign
banks. By December 2006, under the terms of the accession agreement, China had removed all
geographic and customer-related restrictions on foreign banks. Foreign banks are no longer
treated differently from domestic banks and at the end of 2013 there were 42 locally incorporated
foreign banks licensed to engage in both local and foreign currency business with all types of
customers. Foreign banks have a distinct advantage over Chinese banks when it comes to
consortium loans, foreign trade financing, retail business, fund management, and financial
derivatives because of their broader international trading connections that allow them to spread
6

risk and secure different types of customers (Tong, 2005). However, the global financial crisis
harmed foreign banks’ reputations in China and their profitability has deteriorated in the last few
years (the Economist, 2014). Despite this, foreign banks are expected to play a more important
role in the future, by attracting foreign capital, intensifying competition in the Chinese banking
sector, introducing advanced management techniques and expertise, and promoting efficiency
improvements and corporate governance in Chinese banks (Luo et al., 2015).

3. Literature on Chinese banking efficiency
Since the late 1980s, there have been many studies measuring the efficiency of banks, using
either parametric (e.g., Stochastic Frontier Analysis) or non-parametric (e.g., data envelopment
analysis) approaches 7 . The estimation of bank efficiency is important because it allows
practitioners and policy makers to examine the impact of ownership structure on banking
efficiency (Bonin et al., 2005; Fries and Taci, 2005; Staub et al., 2010; Tzeremes, 2015), to
assess the effects of deregulation on banking efficiency (Bhattacharya et al., 1997; Jaffry et al.,
2013), to investigate the impact of (a changing) market structure on banking efficiency (Berger,
1995; Berger and Hannan, 1997; Fu and Heffernan, 2007), to explore the relations between bank
size and efficiency (Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Chen, 2002), and to evaluate the effect of
governance changes (Berger et al., 2005).
Over the last thirty years, the Chinese banking sector has experienced significant institutional
and structural changes, which have attracted a number of scholars to study Chinese bank
efficiency. Chen et al. (2005) used data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate the cost,
technical, and allocative efficiency of 43 Chinese banks over the period 1993 - 2000. Their
results show that the Big Four state-owned banks had higher technical efficiency and allocative
efficiency than the national JSCBs. They also found that the financial deregulation policies
implemented in 1995 improved both the technical and allocative efficiency of the Chinese
banking sector. Ariff and Can (2008) also used DEA to investigate the cost and profit efficiency
of 28 Chinese commercial banks over the period from 1995 to 2004. Their results show that over
the entire study period, cost efficiency is greater than profit efficiency although the latter has
been growing at a faster pace. JSCBs and CCBs, on average, appear to be more efficient than the
SOCBs. Furthermore, they show that medium-sized Chinese banks are significantly more
efficient than both their smaller or larger counterparts.
Fu and Heffernan (2007) employ SFA to investigate the X-efficiency of the Chinese banking
sector over the period 1985 to 2002. Their results show that the JSCBs were relatively more X7

See Duygun and Pasiouras (2010) for a survey of research in this area. They review recent studies that use operational research
and artificial intelligence techniques to assess bank efficiency and performance.
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efficient than the SOCBs. Similarly, Kumbhakar and Wang (2007), using an input stochastic
distance function approach, found that the four largest SOCBs were less technically efficient
than the JSCBs over the period 1993-2002. They also found that small banks tend to be more
efficient than large banks and that there was no evidence that deregulation had significantly
improved Chinese banking efficiency.
Berger et al. (2009) used SFA to analyse alternative profit and cost efficiency measures for
Chinese banks over the period from 1994 to 2003. They found that foreign banks and non-BigFour state-owned banks were the most cost-efficient Chinese banks, followed by the Big Four,
with private domestic banks being the least cost-efficient. They also find that foreign banks were
the most profit-efficient, followed by private domestic banks and non-Big-Four state-owned
banks, with Big Four state-owned banks found to be the least profit-efficient. The main focus of
Berger et al.’s (2009) study, however, was on the effects of minority foreign ownership. They
reported that minority foreign ownership has a positive effect on both cost and profit efficiency.
Jiang et al. (2009) used stochastic distance function models to examine the technical
efficiency of major Chinese commercial banks over the period from 1995 to 2005. They found
that joint stock banks and the Big Four state-owned banks were the most efficient Chinese banks
with foreign banks the least efficient. More recently, Asmild and Matthews (2012) applied multidirectional efficiency analysis (a non-parametric approach) to investigate the efficiency levels of
Chinese commercial banks over the period 1997-2008. Their results show that joint equity banks
are more efficient than the Big Four state-owned banks. However, they also found that since
2003, the efficiency of the state-owned banks has improved.
In summary, our brief review of the Chinese banking efficiency literature shows some mixed
and contradictory results and identifies some research gaps8. To help address these gaps in the
literature, we use a one-stage stochastic frontier model (Battese and Coelli, 1995) to assess the
efficiencies of Chinese banks over the period 2002-2013 in order to provide additional empirical
evidence in this area.

4. Methodology and variables
4.1. Empirical method
In this study, we use SFA, as developed by Aigner et al. (1977), to estimate both cost and
profit efficiencies, which measure how far away a bank’s cost or profit is from that of the
hypothetical “best practice” bank if both banks were producing the same output configuration

8

Appendix A summarizes the results from the major efficiency studies on the Chinese banking sector. Differences in findings
across studies may be due to different methodologies, model specifications, and the sample periods being analysed.
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under the same environmental conditions 9,10 (see Berger and Mester, 1997; Isik and Hassan,
2002). The efficiency scores are estimated using the one-stage stochastic frontier model (Battese
and Coelli, 1995), where the effects of the environmental variables on inefficiency are modelled
jointly with the cost (or profit) frontier, in order to account for variables (such as ownership
structure, market structure, etc.) that may have a significant influence on bank efficiency levels.
The cost and profit frontier models are expressed as follows:
TCit  f (Yit ,Wit , Zit ;  )  vit  uit and uit   Eit  wit

and

 it  f (Yit ,Wit , Zit ;  )  vit  uit and uit   Eit  wit
where t denotes the time dimension; TC and π are respectively the observed total costs and profits
of a bank before tax; Yi and Wi are vectors of output and input prices for the ith bank; Zi is a
vector of control variables; β is a vector of technology parameters; νit is a two-sided normal
disturbance term with zero mean and variance  v2 and represents the effects of statistical noise;
the inefficiency term uit is independently but not identically distributed and takes the form
uit ~ N+(dEit,su); the truncation point is dEit.; Eit captures the observed factors that are assumed
to determine efficiency; δ is a vector of estimated parameters, and the random error term wit
captures the effect of the “unobserved” factors and follows a truncated normal distribution with
zero mean and constant variance.

4.2. Variable definitions
There are two main approaches in the banking literature to measure the flow of services that
banks provide; these are the production approach and the intermediation approach. Under the
production approach, banks are thought of as production units that utilize physical inputs such as
capital and labour to produce transactions and document-processing services for their customers,
such as taking customer deposits and issuing loans. The intermediation approach (IA), suggested
by Sealey and Lindley (1977), treats a bank as an intermediary that collects funds from savers
and transforms those funds into profitable projects (loans and other earning assets). These two
approaches differ in their views of the role of banks but neither fully captures the dual roles of
9

Each bank is benchmarked against the fitted stochastic frontier (sometimes called the best-practice frontier), which indicates the
cost or profit of a bank that uses the best practices under ideal conditions (Hughes and Mester, 2012)
10
There are two different versions of the profit efficiency concept, namely, standard profit efficiency (SPE) and alternative profit
efficiency (APE). SPE shows how close a bank is to generating the maximum profits, given specified input prices and output
prices. It assumes that output markets are perfectly competitive. In contrast, APE assumes that imperfect competition exists, so
that banks have some market power over what they charge. APE measures how close a bank is to earning maximum profits, by
adjusting the price of outputs and the quantity of inputs given a particular level of output, and particular input prices. Therefore,
this approach allows us to estimate profit efficiency without having any information on output prices. Because there are no
reliable data available on banks’ output prices, and there is imperfect competition in the Chinese banking sector, we use APE in
our analysis. See Berger and Mester (1997) for a more detailed discussion of this issue.
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financial institutions. Our study follows the intermediation approach as it has certain conceptual
advantages and the data needed to implement it are readily available.11 Total costs (TC) include
interest expenses, salaries and employee benefits and other operating costs. For profit efficiency
estimation, we use profits before tax (PBT) to replace total costs. The outputs consist of total
loans (y1), other earning assets (y2), and non-interest income (y3). 12 , 13 Note that the input
variables are not incorporated explicitly into the efficiency frontier models summarized in
equation (1) but are represented by the impact of their input prices. There are three input prices:
the price of total borrowed funds (w1) (the ratio of total interest expenses to total borrowed
funds), the price of physical capital (w2), also known as the flow factor price for capital
(measured by the ratio of other operating expenses to fixed assets) 14, and the price of labour (w3)
(using the ratio of personnel expenses to the number of employees as a proxy). In addition to the
above input prices and output variables, we also include the total equity capital of the individual
banks (z) as a quasi-fixed input15. This is used to control for insolvency risk as it provides a
cushion against portfolio losses and financial distress and influences the probability of a bank’s
failure. In addition, because banks lever their equity capital with demandable debt to reflect their
attitudes toward risk, it can control for the different risk preferences of banks (see Mester, 1996).
The time trend variable (T) is also included in the stochastic cost function in order to control for
the effects of technical progress.
We also incorporate environmental variables into our efficiency model in order to account for
heterogeneity and to investigate the determinants of bank efficiency. Bank size is considered an
important factor that may affect efficiency and it can be used to control for potential scale biases
11

The intermediation approach treats deposits as an input, which is more convincing than the production approach (which treats
deposits as an output) since they are paid for in part by interest payments and the funds raised provide the bank with its basic
“raw material”, namely, investable funds. Furthermore, the intermediation approach emphasizes the overall costs of banks, and is
thus appropriate for addressing questions related to cost minimization (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990). Moreover, the intermediation
approach uses money values as measures of output (for loans, other earning assets, and non-interest income, etc.) and the
necessary information to construct the measures is generally available from a bank’s financial statements or from other sources
(e.g., the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking). Against this, the production approach requires information such as the
number of accounts, the number of loans, etc., which is generally not publicly available. Finally, the intermediation approach is
also the most widely used approach in the empirical bank efficiency literature and, as Berger and Humphrey (1997) suggest, the
intermediation approach is better for measuring the efficiency of banks as a whole.
12
Although off balance sheet (OBS) items are technically non-earning assets, they increase the bank’s income and are an
important component of the banking business. Therefore, they should be included when modelling a bank’s cost characteristics,
otherwise total output will be understated (Jagtiani and Khanthavit, 1996). Thus, following Fu and Heffernan (2007), LozanoVivas and Pasiouras (2010), and Liadaki and Gaganis (2010), we use the non-interest income as a proxy for non-traditional
activities, that is, OBS items.
13
The non-interest income is not the best proxy for banking output because it is an earning rather than a financial output.
However, data on aggregated OBS items are not available for all banks in the sample. A common feature of non-traditional
activities is that they generate non-interest income for a bank. Hence, the non-interest income can serve as proxy for nontraditional activities. Moreover, Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras (2010) show that using either aggregated OBS items or non-interest
income as an indicator of non-traditional activities have similar impacts on the estimation of efficiency.
14
Other operation expenses is equal to general operating expenses (overhead costs) less personnel expenses. It consists of
depreciation expenses and other expenditure on fixed assets (e.g., maintenance and material costs).
15
Using the level of equity as a quasi-fixed input rather than the equity to asset ratio in the cost function is standard in the
literature (e.g., Berger and Mester, 1997; Duygun et al., 2013). The reason is well explained by Mester and Hughes (1993) and
Mester (1996). The banks may not hold the optimal level of equity capital if that level implies a degree of risk, which is
unacceptable (a bank exhibits some risk aversion) and/or the regulations set minimum capital requirements.

10

in the estimation process (Kumbhakar and Wang, 2007). Bank size is an important determinant
of net interest margins and spreads if there are economies of scale in the Chinese banking sector.
In other words, one bank may be more efficient than another as a result of the economies of scale
that arise from size rather than because of better management. Casu and Girardone (2006) find
that larger banks might reap efficiency benefits from economies of scale and/or scope.
Furthermore, larger banks may have better qualified and experienced management teams, that
are more effective in cost control, thereby resulting in higher profits (Evanoff and Israilevich,
1991). Instead of introducing arbitrary size dummies into the modelling procedure (e.g.,
Kumbhakar and Wang, 2007), we use the logarithm of total assets as a proxy for bank size
(ln(TA)). The competitive conditions of the market in which a bank operates may influence its
efficiency level (see Fries and Taci, 2005; Casu and Girardone, 2009; Koetter et al., 2012).
Banks in highly concentrated (less competitive) markets exercise market power by charging
higher spreads than is the case in less concentrated markets. Managers will have less pressure to
control their costs as a consequence of this and may be able to enjoy the “quiet life”
hypothesized by Hicks (Berger and Mester, 1997). In contrast, a competitive market forces banks
to minimize costs and increase profits (e.g., through shifts in outputs) and thus they become more
cost and profit efficient (Schaeck and Čihák, 2010).
We include both the Lerner index (Lerner, 1934) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)
in our model in order to measure the impact of market structure on bank efficiency. We use the
Lerner index, which represents the mark-up of price over marginal costs, as a proxy for the
degree of market power16. HHI is a proxy for market concentration and is defined as the sum of
the squared asset market shares of all banks. We also include a dummy variable (Listed) that
indicates whether or not a bank’s shares are publicly traded on a stock exchange. This
institutional variable is included in order to capture the fact that listing status may improve a
bank’s efficiency because of the market discipline mechanism and the requirement for better
corporate governance that is imposed when listing on a stock exchange (see Ray and Das, 2010;
Jiang et al., 2009). A bank with high government ownership could enjoy the advantage of either
implicit or explicit financial and regulatory support from the government (Faccio et al., 2006).
Hence, banks with more government ownership will have lower default and bankruptcy risk and
will be more likely to attract funds by paying lower rates of interest on borrowing and take on
more risky loans (but with higher return) than other banks. These in turn can possibly reduce a
bank’s borrowing cost and increase revenue, and influence their cost and profit efficiency as a
16

The Lerner index (Lerner, 1934) represents the mark-up of price over marginal costs. Following Carbo et al. (2009), the index
is empirically calculated as (P TAit - MCTAit)/PTAit. PTA is the bank’s average price, measured by the ratio of its total revenues to
total assets and MCTA is the bank’s estimated marginal cost, using a fixed effects model, from a translog cost function with a
single output (total assets), three input prices (i.e., the price of funds, labour and physical capital), a fixed net-put (equity capital),
and technical changes (using a time trend as a proxy).
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consequence. Therefore, we use the proportion of government ownership to control for the
implicit or explicit impact of government guarantee. A bank with high government ownership is
often perceived as enjoying the advantage of either implicit or explicit financial and regulatory
support from the government (Faccio et al., 2006).

Hence, banks with more government

ownership will have low default and bankruptcy risk and would be likely to attract funds by
paying lower rates of interest on borrowing and take more risky loans (but with higher return)
than other banks. These in turn can reduce the banks’ borrowing cost and increase revenue, and
influence their cost and profit efficiency as a consequence.

Finally, we include bank-type

dummy variables in our analysis, in order to capture possible ownership and market
segmentation differences between the Big Five (SOCBs), the JSCBs, the CCBs, and foreign
banks (see Berger et al., 2009; Ferri, 2009; Asmild and Matthews, 2012).

4.3. Model specification
We use the transcendental logarithmic (translog) form, which is the most commonly used
functional form in the bank efficiency literature, to specify the frontier. Our empirical cost
frontier model is as follows:
3
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where ln(TC) is the logarithm of total costs, ln ymit is the logarithm of the mth output of bank i at
time t, ln wjit is the logarithm of the jth input price of bank i at time t, ln zit is the logarithm of the
total equity of bank i at time t, and T is a time trend used to capture technology changes. In
addition, the inefficiency term uit is an explicit function of a number of environmental variables
that are assumed to influence the distance of each bank from best practice; α, β, γ, ψ, φ, λ, ξ, θ, κ,
ρ, η, and δ are the parameters to be estimated, and the standard symmetry restrictions, βnm= βmn
and γjk = γkj, are applied. Finally, the total cost and input price terms are normalized by one of the
input prices, w3, in order to impose a linear homogeneity of degree one on the input prices. The
cost efficiency of a bank is defined as CEit = 1 / exp (u) and takes a value between 0 and 1.
Alternative profit efficiency (APE) is estimated similarly. We use profit before tax as the
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dependent variable, and the same independent variables as we used in the cost function17,18. The
profit efficiency is given as APEit = exp (-u) and also takes a value between 0 and 1.
Besides cost and profit efficiency, we also calculate scale economies using the estimated cost
frontier. The identification of scale economies has many implications. For example, their
existence is usually considered powerful evidence in favour of the benefits of conducting
mergers and acquisitions. According to Panzar and Willig (1977), the overall scale economies
 ln TCit
. If SE > 1, a proportionate rise in all outputs leads to
j 1  ln y jit
3

(SE) can be measured as SEit  1/ 

a less than proportionate rise in total costs, implying the existence of economies of scale. If
SE<1, total costs increase more than proportionately with the increase in outputs, implying
diseconomies of scale. Hence, when a bank is operating under decreasing (increasing) returns to
scale, there is scale inefficiency (efficiency). If SE = 1, then the bank is operating at the optimal
production level in the sense that it exhibits constant returns to scale.
Typically, the equity capital is held for both prudential and regulatory reasons, as equity
capital is helpful for absorbing financial losses and maintaining the soundness of banks. Holding
either an excessive or an inadequate level of equity could impose extra costs on banks. Hence,
defining the appropriate level of equity capital is extremely important. Chinese banks have
experienced massive recapitalization in the last ten years. Therefore, it is of interest to examine
the impact of this recapitalization on the Chinese banking industry’s performance by estimating
the shadow return on equity (SROE)19. SROE, developed by Hughes et al. (2001), is computed
from the negative of the elasticity of a bank’s total costs with respect to the level of equity
capital, that is SROE  

TCit
. For a given set of output prices, changes in total costs are the
z it

negative of the change in economic profit. Therefore, in the short-run cost function, the negative
of the derivative of costs with respect to the fixed level of capital should be considered as the
true implicit return on equity (Kenjegalieva et al., 2009). In other words, it is a measure of how
much banks are willing to pay for their equity capital20, 21.
Generally, banks that are over-leveraged or reliant on debt and thus underutilize equity capital
can be expected to show a relatively high SROE, while banks that are leveraged to a lesser
degree are likely to show a lower value. Banks whose current equity capital levels are well above
17

There are 13 bank observations in the sample that exhibit negative profits. We delete these observations from the sample in
order to ensure that all dependent variables are positive so that the natural log of profit can be taken.
18
As the profit function does not require the linear homogeneity of degree one in prices, we do not normalise the profit before tax
and input price terms by one of the input prices.
19
The shadow return on equity is also known as the shadow price of equity capital.
20
The advantage of using the SROE is that it is estimated from a bank’s cost function and is thus more reliable and closer to the
true cost of equity, while the accounting return on equity, which is widely used in other studies, is calculated from the accounting
figures in financial reports, which are easily manipulated.
21
The SROE will equal the market price when the level of equity minimizes costs or maximizes profits (Hughes et al., 2001).
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the long-run equilibrium, or that are overcapitalized, such as those under a major recapitalization,
may be expected to show a very low or possibly negative SROE (Duygun et al., 2012). Negative
SROE is an indication that the short-run adjustment from one highly leveraged equilibrium
position to another with lower leverage can impose significant short-run adjustment costs. The
critical question for policy makers and banking regulators is whether these short-run adjustment
costs are outweighed by the efficiency benefits.

4.4. Data
Our sample is an unbalanced panel that covers 142 Chinese banks over the period from 2002
to 2013, with a total of 1,163 observations. The sample comprises the five SOCBs, twelve
national and regional JSCBs, 93 CCBs, and 32 foreign banks. At the end of 2013, these banks
owned almost 95.3% of the total assets of Chinese commercial banking institutions. Thus, we
believe that our sample offers a good representation of the overall Chinese banking market. The
data are mainly drawn from BankScope – Fitch’s international bank database – and individual
banks’ annual financial reports. These data are double-checked against other data sources such as
the CBRC’s database, the China Economic Information Network (www.cei.gov.cn), and the
China Statistical Yearbook. All financial variables are measured in the Chinese domestic
currency, Renminbi (RMB), and denoted in millions. The monetary variables have been deflated
to the year 2002 using the Chinese GDP deflator. Appendix B shows the means, standard
deviations, and other statistics of the variables across the 142 banks over the entire sample period
from 2002 to 2013.

5. Empirical results
5.1. Overall cost and profit efficiency
The stochastic cost (profit) frontier models are estimated using maximum likelihood
techniques and the estimated results are reported in Appendix C. Since the main focus of this
study is to analyse efficiency and its determinants, we do not discuss the estimated coefficients
of the frontiers in great detail. However, we do note that the estimated cost function fulfils the
theoretical requirements for a valid cost function in the sense that it turns out to be a monotonic
non-decreasing function of the input prices and outputs and also is concave in the input prices.22
Moreover, the high value of the estimated γ parameter (0.893) indicates that the vast majority of
the residual variation is due to cost inefficiency effects and strongly supports the use of the
stochastic frontier model rather than the standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model.
22

Tests for monotonicity of the cost function are satisfied by every bank in the sample, because point estimates of ∂ln(TC)/
∂ln(Qi) and ∂ln(TC)/ ∂ln(Wi) are all positive. In addition, the Hessian of the estimated cost function with respect to input prices is
negative semi-definite and so the concavity of the cost function in input prices is also satisfied.
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Table 1 shows the estimation results for the cost and profit efficiency levels for the full
sample period as well as for the three sub periods. The overall cost efficiency level of 0.697
suggests that, on average, the sampled banks could potentially reduce their input costs by about
30% by using their inputs more efficiently, without changing their output levels. Similarly, the
overall profit efficiency level of 0.685 suggests that, on average, banks could improve their
profits by 31.5% to match the performance of the “best practice” bank23.
[Insert Table 1 about Here]
To investigate the impact of the banking sector openness policy that began after China’s
accession to the WTO and the recent global financial crisis on the performance of Chinese banks,
we divide our full sample period into three sub periods, WTO transition (2002-2006), post-WTO
transition (2007-2009),24 and post-financial crisis (2010-2013). The results presented in Table 1
show that both the cost and profit efficiency scores, on average, improved over the sample period.
We also use the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 25 tests to examine the efficiency
differences across the transition, post-transition, and post-financial crisis periods. The results of
the tests confirm that the both cost and profit efficiency levels for Chinese banks during the posttransition period are statistically significantly higher than during the transition period and the
cost and profit efficiency levels in the post-financial crisis period are statistically significantly
higher than during the pre-financial crisis period, at the 5% level of significance. The results
imply that the full opening up of the banking sector has had a positive effect on Chinese banks’
performance and the 2008 financial crisis did not have a significant impact on the Chinese
banking sector. These improvements in efficiency may be due to the measures taken in the
recent banking reforms, such as the writing off of a large number of toxic assets, recapitalization,
corporate governance improvements, risk management improvement26, and the introduction of
foreign strategic investors.

23

In order to check the robustness of our results, we also use an SFA model with an alternative specification of outputs (the
value-added approach) to estimate both cost and profit efficiencies. The value-added approach focuses on the intermediation
activities of banks but suggests that deposits should also be considered as an output since they constitute elements on which
customers bear opportunity costs and are involved in the creation of added value (see Berger and Humphrey (1997) for a more
detailed discussion). The mean cost efficiency and profit efficiency obtained from the value-added approach are 4.6% and 13%
lower than the intermediation approach. But the trends of efficiency levels obtained from the two approaches are broadly similar
over time. The Spearman rank correlations between them are 74.12% for cost efficiency and 81.47% for profit efficiency,
respectively.
24
China joined the WTO in 2001, but the opening up of the financial market has been gradual and cautious. According to her
WTO commitments, China was required to gradually open up its banking sector by removing regulatory obstacles over a fiveyear transition period (2002-2006). Since the end of this transition period, the Chinese banking sector has been fully open to
foreign competitors.
25
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is based on comparisons of the ranks rather than the averages.
26
The quality of loans is significantly improved over the sample periods. According to the CBRC, the non-performing loan ratio
of commercial banks decreased dramatically from 17.6% in 2003 to 6.7% in 2007 and further decreased to 1.5% in 2013.
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5.2. Efficiency based on ownership differences
The Chinese banking sector can be divided into four major categories, namely SOCBs,
JSCBs, CCBs, and foreign banks (FBs). Although these banks all operate in the same market,
each group has distinct ownership structures and market segmentation, and faces a different set
of regulations. In the light of this uneven and varying regulatory environment, we expect to find
performance variations both across the groups of banks and over time. We explain these
variations below.
The mean values of the cost and profit efficiency scores, according to bank type, are reported
in Table 1 for both the full period and the sub periods. Table 1 shows that the FBs, on average,
are the most cost-efficient, with scores of 79.9%, followed by the CCBs (67.9%), JSCBs (66.5%),
and the SOCBs (63.1%). In contrast, the results for profit efficiency show that the SOCBs
(76.8%) and JSCBs (76.2%) are the most profit-efficient, followed by the CCBs (74.3%), and
FBs (38.5%), which are the least profit-efficient. The results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
tests show that most of the differences are significant, and this is further confirmed by our onestage estimation results that are shown later, in Appendix C (Panel B).
The sub period results for the different categories of banks are revealing. Both the cost and
profit efficiency results suggest that the SOCBs are the least efficient during the pre-transition
period but become the most efficient after the transition. The cost efficiency of the SOCBs
increases by 7.8% and the profit efficiency by 24.4% between the two periods. These increases
in efficiency indicate that banks took advantage of the recent reforms, which include partial
privatization, the introduction of foreign strategic investors, the listing of banks’ share capital on
foreign and Chinese exchanges, and the establishment of a system for boards of directors. These
reforms improve the banks’ governance mechanisms and lead them to engage in more marketoriented business. In contrast, however, both cost and profit efficiencies of foreign banks have
deteriorated significantly in the financial crisis period, implying that adverse circumstances
arising out of foreign banks’ home operations had spill over effects on their Chinese operations.
We analyze the efficiency levels in more detail, by bank type. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the
average values of cost and profit efficiency over the sample period, based on bank type. As we
can see from Figure 1, foreign banks exhibit very good performance in cost efficiency relative to
the other types of banks, implying that they may have better managerial expertise, experience,
technology, and governance. The trend or patterns of cost efficiency levels for the other types of
banks are broadly similar over time. The cost efficiency of domestic banks has gradually
improved over the sample period. This is due to the Chinese government encouraging domestic
banks to introduce foreign strategic investors, improve their corporate governance, and become
listed on stock exchanges. These measures appear to have enhanced banks’ performances.
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[Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 about Here]
We observe that foreign banks exhibit much lower profit efficiency than other types of banks
(Figure 2). This implies that foreign banks may lack local knowledge of the market and are
hampered by (implicit) restrictions on the extent of their business activities, which constrain their
earnings and profitability. It is also difficult for foreign banks, especially the new entrants, to
attract customers who have long-term relationship with domestic banks. Moreover, given limited
bank networks and customer base, many loan products and fee-based services such as mortgage
loans and paying utility bills on behalf of bank clients may not be very profitable.
Figure 2 also shows a decline in profit efficiency in the FBs during 2008-2009. This
significant decline may reflect the costs for FBs of setting up their businesses and carrying out
branch expansion programmes and/or a difficulty in expanding FB presence in China during that
period. The results also suggest that the recent global crisis has had a negative impact on the
foreign banks in China. However, profit efficiency has begun to improve from 2009 onwards and
the improvement may be due to the removal of business restrictions, the strong demand for
corporate credit from multinationals expanding within China, and an increasing number of local
enterprise customers. The profit efficiency of Chinese domestic banks has improved over the
sample period, implying that they have benefited from the strong national economic growth in
last ten years. However, there was a decline between 2007 and 2009, which may be due to the
global financial crisis that curtailed growth.

More specifically, the SOCBs have shown a

considerable improvement in average profit efficiency from 2004 to 2013, climbing from 54.1%
in 2004 to 89.16% in 2013. This finding implies that the continuing banking reforms have helped
to improve the SOCBs’ profitability and profit efficiency. The improvement may also be due to
strong government connections and priority roles in implementing government policies, such as
infrastructure spending, which have boosted their earnings and profitability. The CCBs also
exhibit an increase in profit efficiency over the sample period. There are several possible
explanations for this result. First, in the past, the CCBs were often controlled directly by local
governments and experienced significant pressure to lend for policy purposes. However, during
the last decade, the local government’s ownership in CCBs has decreased significantly and this
may have correspondingly reduced political inference in the banks’ operating decisions, leading
to improved corporate governance and profit performance. In addition, the CCBs often focus on
the usury market, where borrowers such as small and medium-sized businesses are charged
relatively high interest rates. As a result, these banks could be reaping very high profits that
improve their profit efficiency.
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CCBs play an increasingly important role in the funding of SMEs. Overall, China’s growth
has been impressive but there are considerable imbalances in the economic development across
different regions of the country. The municipalities and the eastern and coastal areas have
generally developed more quickly and have more mature private economies than the northern
and western areas. Therefore, we now investigate whether the performance of a CCB depends on
the economic development of the geographical area in which it conducts its business. We divide
China into six economic regions plus an extra category made up of four municipalities27. As
shown in Table 2, the CCBs in the (eastern) coastal and (central) south areas exhibit good overall
performance in terms of both cost and profit efficiency. The CCBs located in four municipalities
show high profit efficiency but low cost efficiency. However, the CCBs in the north, northwest,
and northeast show relatively low levels of cost and profit efficiency. These results suggest that a
CCB’s performance is positively related to the level of economic development in the region in
which it is located. The sub period results show that banks from all regions have improved both
their cost and profit efficiencies since the transition period, which suggests that strong economic
growth can lead to significant efficiency gains for banks in all regions.
[Insert Table 2 about Here]
Banks in provincial capitals generally come under stricter regulatory scrutiny and pay higher
subsidies than those in cities that are not the capitals of provinces. Thus, we also investigate
whether the administrative status of the city in which the bank is located plays a role in
determining its efficiency. We compare both the cost and profit efficiency of CCBs in provincial
cities and cities that are not provincial capitals. Banks from non-provincial capital cities show
more cost and profit efficiency than the banks from provincial capital cities. Meanwhile, the sub
period results show that, although both subcategories of banks have enjoyed improvements in
both cost and profit efficiency, the CCBs in cities that are not provincial capitals have benefitted
more since the transition period.

5.3. Economies of scale
Industry economies of scale have important implications for regulators and bank managers in
terms of growth and merger and acquisition issues. In this section we use the cost frontier model
outlined earlier, to analyse the economies of scale in the Chinese banking sector over the period
2002-2013 for the same four categories of banks as above.
27

The six regions are the centre and south (Henan, Hubei, Hunan, An'hui and Jiangxi), the east coast (Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian,
Shandong, Guangdong and Hainan), the north (Inner Mongolia, Hebei and Shanxi), the northeast (Jilin, Liaoning and
Heilongjiang), the southwest (Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Guangxi and Tibet), and the northwest (Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai,
Ningxia and Xinjiang), and the four municipalities are Beijing, Shanghai,Tianjin, and Chongqing.
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[Insert Table 3 about Here]
Table 3 reports the annual estimates of scale economies calculated using the SFA model. We
find that the economies of scale for non-SOCB banks over the period 2002-2013 are significantly
greater than one, suggesting the existence of economies of scale in the Chinese banking sector.
We also note that the estimates exhibit a decreasing trend over time and this pattern indicates that
Chinese banks have made efforts to achieve optimal operating efficiency over time (constant
returns to scale). Based on the estimates for each type of bank, the table shows that significant
scale economies exist in the CCBs and FBs. This, in turn, implies that small banks can
potentially save on operating costs by extending their production scale or through mergers. For
the SOCBs, the scale economies are significantly less than one, with a slightly decreasing trend.
This result suggests that the big banks are experiencing diseconomies of scale and, therefore,
could reduce their average costs and achieve efficiency gains by decreasing their scale of
operations. However, the big SOCBs will face major challenges if they try to cut their costs, for
example, by reducing the number of branches and employees across the country and reducing the
large amount of lending for social and political purposes. Moreover, as the SOCBs are generally
in a monopoly position, they have less incentive to reduce their costs by downsizing. Note, also,
that the scale economies for JSCBs for the later sample period (2006-2013) are very close to
unity (that is, these banks exhibit almost constant returns to scale), indicating that the JSCBs
generally have optimal asset size and are the most scale-efficient banks. In summary, the results
suggest that the average cost curve for the Chinese banking sector is U-shaped, with mediumsized banks being more scale-efficient than either very large or very small banks.

5.4. Shadow return on equity
As most Chinese banks were undercapitalized before the country joined the WTO in 2001,
one of the most important aspects of the recent banking reforms was the recapitalization of the
domestic banks in order that they would fulfil the minimum capital adequacy ratio (8%)
requirement. Therefore, one of the key objectives of this paper is to examine the effect of
recapitalization on the Chinese banking industry by examining the SROE.
[Insert Figure 3 about Here]
As shown in Figure 3, there is a decreasing trend in the SROE for different types of banks
over the full sample period. However, the SROE of Foreign banks and JSCBs show an increase
during the global financial crisis period, implying that these banks seem willing to pay more to
increase their equity capital during that period. These results suggest that recapitalization leads to
a decrease in the SROE; the decline may also reflect the relatively low funding costs and the
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increased competition in the Chinese banking sector. The increase in SROE in 2008-2009 may
be due to a rise in the central bank’s interest rate and funding costs during those years, thus
implying that these banks are willing to pay more to raise their equity capital during the financial
crisis period. It is interesting to note that the sign on the SROE is positive initially, but becomes
negative by the end of the period. This may be because, during or after a severe recapitalization
period, banks tend to deviate from their long-run equilibrium, which can cause the SROE to
become negative. This finding is consistent with Duygun et al. (2012), who find that, during a
recapitalization period, the SROEs of Turkish banks also become negative. In addition, we find
that the mean SROE is consistently higher for FBs than for domestic commercial banks. This
implies that FBs are still underutilizing equity capital or have funding costs that are higher than
those of their counterparts.
Overall, our results suggest that the short-run adjustment from one highly leveraged
equilibrium position to another with lower leverage can impose significant short-run adjustment
costs. Policy makers should be cautious of the fact that the increased efficiency may be offset by
the adjustment costs imposed by the recapitalization process. This is a critical question for both
policy makers and banking regulators.

5.5. Efficiency and shadow return on equity
The relation between the SROE and banks’ cost and profit efficiency is also of interest. Table
4 reports the mean of the SROE for the most and least efficient quartiles of banks. We find that
the most efficient banks have significantly smaller SROEs. This indicates that the least efficient
banks appear to be over-leveraged and appear to underutilize equity relative to the most efficient
banks, and they may be able to improve their efficiency by holding extra capital.
[Insert Table 4 about Here]
Given the absence of a priori theory regarding the relation between efficiency and SROE, we
also use the PVAR method for our analysis. The PVAR framework explicitly addresses the
endogeneity problem by treating all variables as potentially endogenous and modelling the
feedback loops between the variables28. Table 4 reports the correlations between the (cost and
profit) efficiency scores and the SROE. We find a negative relationship between the efficiency
scores and the estimated SROE. Table 5 presents the parameter estimates of the system of
equations for cost and profit efficiency and SROE. The SROE impact on cost efficiency is
negative but not significant; however its impact on profit efficiency is significant and negative,
suggesting that, generally, decreasing the SROE by raising equity capital could lead to increased
28

See Love and Zicchino (2006), Koutsomanoli-Filippaki and Mamatzakis (2009), and Love and Ariss (2014) for a more detailed
discussion on the PVAR method.
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profit efficiency levels for banks29. On the other hand, the impact of SROE on both profit and
cost efficiencies is significant and negative. This result implies that a causal relationship from
SROE to efficiency may exist.
Next we focus our discussion on the impulse-response results presented in Figure 4 which
show the response of each variable of the VAR analysis (cost or profit efficiency and SROE) to
its own innovation and to the innovation of the other variable. From the first row of Figure 4 the
effect of a one standard deviation shock of SROE on cost and profit efficiency is negative but is
relative small in magnitude. The response of efficiency to a shock in SROE takes place after 2
years, while it converges towards the zero line thereafter. These results weakly confirm our
previous finding that reduced SROE could lead to increased efficiency. On the other hand, we
observe that SROE decreases in response to a positive shock in efficiency, suggesting that
reverse causality in regard to efficiency and SROE also exists and indicating that improvement in
efficiency could reduce the true implicit return on equity (i.e. SROE). To further support our
analysis, we present variance decompositions (VDCs), which indicate the percentage of the
variation in one variable that is explained by the shock in another. We report the total effect
accumulated over 10 and 20 years in Table 6. We observe that cost and profit efficiencies explain
about 30% and 24% of the variation in SROE after 20 years, respectively, while SROE explains
about 7% and 7.6% of the variance in cost and profit efficiencies, respectively. The results
provide more evidence reaffirming the significance of efficiency in explaining the variation in
SROE.

[Insert Table 5 and Table 6 about Here]
[Insert Figure 4 about Here]

5.6. Determinants of cost and profit efficiency
The main benefit of using Battese and Coelli’s (1995) model is that it enables us to not only
examine the level of efficiency but also investigate the potential determinants of efficiency in
Chinese banks 30 . The impact of environmental factors on Chinese banks’ cost and profit
efficiencies are reported in panel B of Appendix C. The coefficients on the logarithm of total
assets are statistically significant and positive for the profit efficiency scores, indicating that
larger banks seem to be relatively more profit-efficient than smaller banks. Our findings here are
29

One must bear in mind, as we showed in the previous section, that massive recapitalization can push the SROE into a negative
region. The adjustment costs imposed by a recapitalization process could offset the efficiency gains.
30
We also use PVAR to examine the relations between the efficiency scores and their determinant factors as a robustness test. In a
PVAR system all variables are endogenously determined. Therefore, we only include the variables (i.e. bank size, HHI, Lerner
Index, and government ownership) which might be considered to be endogenous for the PVAR analysis. The results are generally
consistent with the findings by using the one stage stochastic frontier approach (SFA). The results are available on request.
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in line with many previous efficiency studies (e.g., Srairi, 2010). This effect could be due to
larger banks’ wider penetration of the market and their ability to increase revenue at a relatively
lower cost (Perera et al., 2007). They may also have more professional or specialized
management teams that are better able to control costs and increase revenue.
Positive and statistically significant coefficients for the Lerner index in the cost model,
suggest that banks with greater market power (a larger Lerner value) are better at minimizing
costs. However, we also find a significantly negative relationship between the Lerner index and
profit efficiency. This result seems to support that the “quiet life” hypothesis, which asserts that
banks with market power forego revenues or incur higher costs. However, we do not find any
significant relationship between efficiency and the concentration indicator (HHI)31. Concerning
the effect of a stock exchange listing on bank efficiency, we find that the coefficient associated
with the listed bank dummy variable is statistically significant, with a positive impact on cost
efficiency. This result suggests that the intense public scrutiny that accompanies a stock listing
exerts market discipline over bank management and listed banks are thus more cost-efficient than
banks that are not listed. However, this relationship is not significant in the profit efficiency
model, suggesting that the listing effect does not contribute to the level of profit efficiency. In
addition, the coefficients show that FBs exhibit higher cost efficiencies than JSCBs, SOCBs, and
CCBs but significantly underperform other types of banks in terms of profit efficiency. The
magnitudes of the coefficients indicate that JSCBs are the most cost efficient among Chinese
domestic banks and SOCBs are the most profit-efficient. These results generally confirm the
findings discussed earlier. Finally, we find that banks with higher government ownership tend to
be more profit efficient, implying that the higher level of government guarantee can help banks
to reduce some borrowing costs and increase revenue, which in turn improves banks’ profit
efficiency.

6. Conclusion
This paper examines the cost and profit efficiencies of 142 commercial banks in China, over
the period 2002-2013. It compares the performance of Chinese banks across different ownership
types before and after the completion of the WTO transition period (including post global
financial crisis period). Our findings show that the cost and profit efficiency levels are, on
average, around 70%. To improve efficiency levels, banks need to pay more attention to both the
cost-minimizing and revenue-generating processes. We further compare the efficiency based on
31

Many studies use the market concentration measure as a proxy for the degree of market power but this broad measure fails to
assess individual firms’ abilities to charge marked-up prices (Boone, 2008).

22

different types of banks. The CCBs and JSCBs show more cost efficiency than the SOCBs over
the sample period. However, the CCBs are less profit-efficient, while the FBs have the lowest
profit efficiency scores. We find that both the cost and profit efficiency have increased across all
types of domestic banks since the WTO transition period was completed. This improvement
suggests that opening up the banking sector has had a positive effect on the performance of
China’s banks, and there is no doubt that the recent banking reform in China has been fruitful.
However, the profit advantage of domestic banks over foreign banks is widening after the WTO
transition period because of institutional arrangements and cultural and social networks.
Given the increasing importance of CCBs to the Chinese banking sector, we also compare
CCBs based on geographical differences. Our findings show that CCBs in the four municipalities
and in more developed areas of China enjoy the highest performance levels in terms of profit
efficiency, suggesting that the level of economic development in the region in which a CCB is
located plays an important role in determining the CCB’s performance. The sub period results
show that banks from all regions improve both their cost and profit efficiency scores after the
WTO transition period. We next do a comparison of whether CCBs in cities that are not
provincial capitals exhibit higher efficiency levels than those in provincial cities. Our empirical
results show that economies of scale are prevalent across the Chinese banking sector. This is
mainly the result of widespread scale economies in small-sized CCBs, suggesting that this group
could obtain cost savings by increasing the scale of their operations. In contrast, the SOCBs
suffer from diseconomies of scale.
The SROE results illustrate an overall decreasing trend over the sample period but with a
slightly increase during the period 2008-2009. It is interesting to note that the sign on average
SROE becomes negative after the financial crisis. The change in sign can be explained by the
increase in the capital ratio due to the recent capital injection given to domestic banks. This
suggests that policy makers and regulators should be cautious about such strategies, as the
increased efficiency may be offset by adjustment costs imposed by the recapitalization process.
Regulators should be alert to the fact that when banks are reducing positions of previous overleveraging, the disequilibrium true implicit ROE could turn negative for a substantial period.
Moreover, by using the PVAR method, we find negative relationships between the efficiency
scores and the SROE. On the other hand, we also find a strong reverse causal relationship
between them, suggesting that an increase in efficiency leads to a decrease in SROE. Last, but
not least, we investigate the factors that influence the efficiency of Chinese banks. We find that
market power and ownership type significantly influence both the cost and profit efficiency of
Chinese banks. Moreover, larger banks and banks with a high level of government guarantee are
more profit efficient that other banks.
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Our results have important policy implications. First, the evidence from our study shows that
the recent Chinese banking reform has been successful in enhancing the performance of Chinese
banks, on both the cost and the profit side. However, there is still much room for improvement,
given the current levels of efficiency. The main source of inefficiency comes from both the cost
and revenue side, implying a need for more fundamental changes in management and operational
decision-making processes, from policy orientation to market orientation. Second, as CCBs are
playing an increasingly important role in local economic development and the funding of SMEs,
the central authorities should encourage and give more support to the development of CCBs,
especially those in less developed regions such as the north and northwest. Third, the findings
regarding economies of scale suggest that small banks such as CCBs could improve their
efficiency by increasing their size, perhaps through mergers and acquisitions. In addition, the
government should completely remove the restriction on CCBs that forces them to operate within
their own cities’ boundaries. This geographical constraint is likely to damage performance levels
by preventing the CCBs from exploring more business opportunities, effectively spreading risk,
and achieving economies of scale. Moreover, small banks in China are generally not able to offer
a full range of services because either they are too expensive to provide or are subject to
regulatory constraints. Therefore, the small banks could adopt the operational model of small
U.S. banks by purchasing (standardized and infrequent) services and products from larger banks
that are either able to offer a broader range of service such as check-clearing, mortgage and
credit card processing, investment banking services, and international transactions 32 . To
accomplish this, small banks could reduce operating expenses and increase revenues by
providing cheaper and broader services to their customers, which in turn improve the banks’ cost
and profit efficiency. Fourth, the SROE analysis should remind policy makers to be cautious
about the fact that, although an increase in equity capital may help banks to absorb financial
losses, it also imposes short-run adjustment costs that may offset the gains in efficiency. Finally,
as public listing is shown to have a positive effect on cost efficiency, the Chinese government
should encourage domestic banks to seek an IPO. This will help banks to widen their funding
sources, reduce their reliance on the government, and achieve better corporate governance and
transparency.
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We thank the reviewer for pointing this issue out.
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Figure 1. Average cost efficiency by bank type

Figure 2. Average profit efficiency by bank type

Figure 3. Shadow return on equity for Chinese banks (2002-2013)

Figure 4 Impulse response functions to shocks
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Table 1. Average efficiency scores and significance of tests for different bank groups
full
sample

Cost efficiency
200220072006
2009

20102013

full
sample

Profit efficiency
200220072006
2010

20102013

Overall

0.697

0.655

0.701

0.712

0.685

0.656

0.674

0.705

FBs

0.799

0.836

0.784

0.802

0.385

0.491

0.357

0.385

CCBs

0.679

0.650

0.686

0.687

0.743

0.662

0.734

0.783

JSCBs

0.665

0.643

0.670

0.687

0.762

0.702

0.749

0.837

SOCBs

0.631

0.592

0.645

0.670

0.768

0.636

0.840

0.880

Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test*
SOCBs vs JSCBs

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

Insig.

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

SOCBs vs CCBs

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

SOCBs vs FBs

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

Sig.

JSCBs vs CCBs

Sig.

Insig.

sig.

Insig.

Sig.

Sig.

Insig.

Sig.

JSCBs vs FBs
Sig.
Sig.
Sig.
Sig.
Sig.
Sig.
Sig.
Sig.
CCBs vs FBs
Sig.
Sig.
Sig.
Sig.
Sig.
Sig.
Sig.
Sig.
Transition vs Post transition period
Sig.
Sig
Pre- vs Post financial crisis
Sig.
Sig.
*We use the non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to check for differences between bank types. This is a non-parametric
analogue to the independent samples t-test and can be used when there is no assumption that the dependent variable is a normally
distributed interval variable. The significance level is at the 5% level.

Table 2. Average efficiency of CCBs by region and administrative status
full
sample

Cost efficiency
200220072006
2009

20092013

Profit efficiency
full
20022007sample
2006
2009

20102013

Central and South

0.698

0.665

0.696

0.707

0.772

0.627

0.742

0.827

East coast

0.685

0.660

0.686

0.687

0.763

0.677

0.698

0.821

North

0.680

0.657

0.687

0.686

0.675

0.638

0.621

0.716

Northeast

0.678

0.652

0.678

0.685

0.750

0.669

0.743

0.783

Northwest

0.679

0.633

0.680

0.695

0.734

0.673

0.754

0.748

Southwest

0.683

0.660

0.692

0.688

0.734

0.571

0.710

0.832

Municipalities

0.645

0.615

0.658

0.659

0.784

0.717

0.800

0.817

Non-provincial capital cities

0.689

0.662

0.695

0.696

0.741

0.654

0.747

0.772

Provincial capital cities

0.670

0.641

0.673

0.677

0.735

0.650

0.690

0.792

Table 3. Economies of scale estimations for Chinese banks (2002-2013)
All

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

FB

1.178*

1.307*

1.275*

1.208*

1.182*

1.174*

1.164*

1.171*

1.166*

1.160*

1.105*

1.085*

1.076*

CCB

1.116*

1.237*

1.198*

1.169*

1.163*

1.157*

1.142*

1.118*

1.091*

1.087*

1.081*

1.075*

1.071*

JSCB

1.016

1.091*

1.075*

1.052*

1.035*

1.024

1.020

1.018

1.015

1.009

0.995

0.993

0.987

SOCB

0.869*

0.902*

0.881*

0.887*

0.879*

0.875*

0.870*

0.869*

0.871*

0.868*

0.861*

0.855*

0.849*

All

1.078*

1.183*

1.175*

1.162*

1.094*

1.089*

1.065*

1.056*

1.058*

1.049*

1.044*

1.041*

1.036*

Notes: 1. Scale economies estimates are evaluated at the mean of the data rather than the mean estimate of scale
economies calculated at each observation.
2. * indicates that scale economies estimates are statistically different from 1 at the 5% level, for a two-tailed test.
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Table 4. Average SROE in different subsamples and test for group differences
Most efficient quartile
Least efficient quartile
Test of SROE difference

CE

SROE

291

0.785

0.016

291

0.629

0.073

a

PE

SROE

288

0.895

-0.003

288

0.329

0.094

-4.833**

-11.349***

a

Notes: Z-value from the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney U test of differences in medians.
** and *** indicate that the difference between the most efficient quartile of banks and the least efficient
quartile of banks is significant at the 5% or 1% level, respectively.

Table 5. Panel VAR of a two variable model
Dependent variable

CE-1

SROE-1

Obs

CE

0.402(0.219)*

-0.032(0.018)*

878

SROE

-0.644(0.435)

0.744(0.048)***

878

PE-1

SROE-1

Obs

PE

0.196 (0.181)

-0.224(0.053)***

866

SROE

-0.116(0.055)**

0.790(0.020)***

866

Notes: The PVAR models are estimated using system GMM. Reported numbers show the coefficients of regressing the
dependent variables on lags of the independent variables.
***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.

Table 6 Estimates of variance decomposition
S

CE

SROE

PE

SROE

CE

10

0.982

0.017

PE

0.982

0.018

SROE

10

0.298

0.699

SROE

0.238

0.760

CE

20

0.982

0.018

PE

0.981

0.019

SROE

20

0.301

0.702

SROE

0.240

0.762

Note: S: time periods ahead (years ahead); CE: cost efficiency; PE: profit efficiency.
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Appendix A
Author / Year

Banks
(obs.)

Period

Method

Variables

Main Results

Chen et al.
(2005)

43 (NA)

19932000

DEA

Outputs: loans, deposits and non-interest income
Inputs: labour, deposit and physical capital

Ariff and Can
(2008)

28 (230)

19952004

DEA

Outputs: loans and investments.
Inputs: loanable funds, number of employees and
physical capital.

Big Four state-owned banks had higher technical efficiency and allocative
efficiency than the national JSCBs
Overall average cost efficiency is higher than the overall average profit efficiency
Profit efficiency remarkably increased while cost efficiency remained almost
unimproved over the study period.
JSCBs and CCBs, on average, appear to be more efficient than the SOCBs.
Medium-sized Chinese banks are significantly more efficient than both their
smaller or larger counterparts.

Fu and Heffernan
(2007)

14 (187)

19852002

SFA

Outputs: total loans, total deposits total investments and
non-interest income
Inputs: funds, labour and fixed assets

JSCBs were relatively more X-efficient than the SOCBs

Kumbhakar and
Wang (2007)

14 (132)

19932002

SFA

Outputs: total loans net, other earning assets
Inputs: labour, fixed assets, total deposit and total
borrowed funds

Four largest SOCBs are less technically efficient than the JSCBs
small banks tend to be more efficient than large banks

Outputs: total loans, total deposits, liquid assets, other
earning assets
Inputs: interest expenses and non-interest expenses

Foreign banks and non-Big-Four state-owned banks are the most cost-efficient
Chinese banks, with private domestic banks being the least cost-efficient.
Foreign banks are the most profit-efficient and Big Four state-owned banks are
the least profit-efficient.
Minority foreign ownership has a positive effect on both cost and profit
efficiency.

Berger et al.
(2009)

38 (266)

Jiang et al.
(2009)

N/A (310)

Asmild and
Matthews (2012)

14 (168)

Hou et al. (2014)

44 (N/A)

Wang et al
(2014)

16 (114)

19942003

19952005

19972008
20072011
20032011

SFA

SFA

DEA
DEA
DEA

Model 1: Outputs: net interest income and non-interest
income; Inputs: total interest expense and non-interest
expense.
Model 2: Outputs: total loans, total deposits and noninterest income; Inputs: total interest expense, labour
costs and physical capital.
Model 3: Outputs: total loans, total deposit and other
earning assets; Inputs: total interest expense, physical
capital, and labour costs.
Outputs: net interest earnings and non-interest earnings
Inputs: number of employees, fixed assets, total deposits
Outputs: total net loan, other earning assets
Inputs: total deposits, fixed assets and no. of employees
Outputs: noninterest income and interest income
Inputs: fixed assets and labour

Notes: N/A: not available; DEA: data envelopment analysis; SFA: stochastic frontier analysis.
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Joint stock banks and the Big Four state-owned banks are the most efficient
Chinese banks, with foreign banks the least efficient.

Joint equity banks are more efficient than the Big Four state-owned banks.
Since 2003, the efficiency of the state-owned banks has improved.
Intense market competition helps improve technical efficiency and technical
efficiency is positive associated with risk taking
The Chinese banking reform improves its overall efficiency over the study period.
Efficiency differences between the state-owned and joint-stock commercial banks
are reduced over the study period

Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics of Variables

a

Description
Full sample
Total costa
Profit before taxa
Total loansa
Total other earning assetsa
Non-interest incomea
Price of funds
Price of physical capital
Price of laboura
Equitya
Time trend
Total assetsa
Government ownership
Herfindahl index
Lerner index
Listed banks
SOCBs
JSCBs
CCBs
Foreign banks
Big banks (SOCBs )
Total costa
Profit before taxa
Total loansa
Total other earning assetsa
Non-interest incomea
Price of funds
Price of physical capital
Price of laboura
Equitya
Total assetsa
Government ownership
Lerner Index
Listed banks
Medium banks (JSCBs)
Total costa
Profit before taxa
Total loansa
Total other earning assetsa
Non-interest incomea
Price of funds
Price of physical capital
Price of laboura
Equitya
Total assetsa
Government ownership
Lerner Index
Listed banks
Small banks (CCBs & FBs)
Total costa
Profit before taxa
Total loansa
Total other earning assetsa
Non-interest incomea
Price of funds
Price of physical capital
Price of laboura
Equitya
Total assetsa
Government ownership
Lerner Index
Listed banks
Unit: RMB one million

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Max.

1163
1150
1163
1163
1163
1163
1163
1163
1163
1163
1163
1163
1163
1163
1163
1163
1163
1163
1163

9881.474
5394.766
194198.7
89983.76
2072.933
0.0205
1.2897
0.1373
20846.27
7.988822
372112
0.1437
0.1030
0.4048
0.1263
0.0515
0.1169
0.6509
0.1805

31874.85
20706.68
647149.2
322630.7
7757.766
0.0091
2.2010
0.0723
75182.19
2.9157
1237182
0.2018
0.0178
0.1783
0.3324
0.221294
0.321486
0.47689
0.384825

21.699
0.475
58.871
0.589
0.353
0.004
0.087
0.019
1.213
1
609.601
0
0.077
-1.651
0
0
0
0
0

281002
221342.1
5536780
2834485
79329.89
0.081
22.125
0.560958
745433.8
12
10600000
1
0.153
0.764
1
1
1
1
1

60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60
60

124909.1
72422.49
2614144
1275640
27383.33
0.01626
0.43569
0.094306
278064.2
4943842
0.724161
0.1812
0.633333

65934.39
56124.25
1246107
702515.1
21255.59
0.003274
0.090474
0.031635
188127.5
2487303
0.218669
0.1236
0.485961

18955
1579.107
426763
159301
1863
0.011494
0.231227
0.038762
1.308942
732003
0.3095
-0.1512
0

281002
221463.2
5536780
2834485
79329.89
0.025698
0.592833
0.140135
745433.8
10600000
1
0.3321
1

136
136
136
136
136
136
136
136
136
136
136
136
136

19377.3
9114.726
346777.7
114123.5
2893.293
0.021113
0.803062
0.18368
32538.38
6.727941
0.061981
0.2202
0.558824

18099.23
10295.95
284570.2
96673.73
3774.171
0.006884
0.336569
0.056272
35862.93
3.415578
0.143594
0.0973
0.498363

458.0666
253.6
7276
3189.501
107.8652
0.010444
0.26595
0.022108
1.213689
1
0
-0.2526
0

80699.81
45454.09
1293452
503300.8
20066.19
0.044811
2.83595
0.318255
156571
12
0.7088
0.3876
1

967
954
967
967
967
967
967
967
967
967
967
967
967

1408.788
680.525
22588.12
13021.63
387.1074
0.020713
1.41122
0.133457
3242.133
8.258532
0.11926
0.2659
0.034126

2114.895
1059.756
33573.69
20843.47
281.7002
0.009597
2.391229
0.073245
4358.811
2.724281
0.144002
0.1865
0.181647

21.69921
0.475
58.87103
0.58871
0.353226
0.003838
0.087403
0.018988
30.53464
1
0
-1.6509
0

23217.14
11209.4
344314.2
188705.2
2690.583
0.080087
22.125
0.560958
46099.61
12
0.9264
0.7647
1
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Appendix C. Parameter estimates of the cost and profit frontier
Panel A
Cost frontier
Variables
lny1
lny2
lny3
ln(w1/w3)
ln(w2/w3)

Coefficient
0.564***
0.138***
0.135***
0.730***
0.055**

t-Ratio
35.93
14.39
7.77
56.03
5.65

0.5* lny1^2
lny1*lny2
lny1*lny3
0.5*lny2^2
lny2*lny3
0.5*lny3^2
0.5*ln(w1/w3)^2
ln(w1/w3)*ln(w2/w3)

-0.004***
-0.033***
-0.034**
0.024***
-0.024**
0.072***
0.066***
-0.017

-0.15
9.84
-2.22
7.94
-2.34
5.24
2.77
-1.18

0.5*ln(w2/w3) ^2

0.003

0.23

lny1*ln(w1/w3)
lny1*ln(w2/w3)

-0.055***
0.102***

-3.47
7.68

lny2*ln(w1/w3)
lny2*ln(w2/w3)

0.015**
-0.011*

2.19
-1.93

lny3*ln(w1/w3)
lny3*ln(w2/w3)

-0.036*
0.037**

-1.93
2.55

lnz
0.5*lnz^2
lnz*lny1
lnz*lny2
lnz*lny3
lnz1*ln(w1/w3)
lnz1*ln(w2/w3)

0.131***
0.000
-0.021**
0.032***
-0.011
0.080***
-0.104***

7.48
0.04
-2.08
3.99
-0.93
4.36
-6.58

T
0.5*T^2
T lny1
Tlny2
Tlny3
T*ln(w1/w3)
T*ln(w2/w3)

0.015
-0.003
-0.058***
-0.021***
0.004
-0.009**
0.002

1.1
-1.61
-7.02
-5.21
1.12
-2.13
0.6

Profit frontier
Variables
lny1
lny2
lny3
lnw1
lnw2
lnw3
0.5* lny1^2
lny1*lny2
lny1*lny3
0.5*lny2^2
lny2*lny3
0.5*lny3^2
0.5*lnw1^2
lnw1*lnw2
lnw1*lnw3
0.5*lnw2 ^2
Lnw2*lnw3
lny1*lnw1
lny1*lnw2
lny1*lnw3
lny2*lnw1
lny2*lnw2
lny2*lnw3
lny3*lnw1
lny3*lnw2

Coefficient
0.232***
0.067***
0.151***
0.092***
0.179***
0.164***
0.122***
0.038*
-0.11326
0.015*
-0.002
0.099***
-0.236**
-0.128***
0.063
0.021
0.003
-0.152***
0.110***
-0.103**
0.061**
-0.060***
0.021
0.110***
0.787***

lny3*lnw3

0.117***

lnz
0.5*lnz^2
lnz*lny1
lnz*lny2
lnz*lny3
lnz*lnw1
lnz*lnw2
lnz*lnw3
T
0.5*T^2
T lny1
Tlny2
Tlny3
T*lnw1
T*lnw2
T*lnw3
Tlnz
Constant

0.344***
0.061***
0.001
-0.048*
0.014
0.132**
0.042**
-0.049
-0.014
-0.001
0.020***
0.005278
-0.028***
0.008
-0.023***
-0.018
0.005
0.638***

t-Ratio
7.41
4.24
5.2
3.02
8.00
5.17
3.01
1.68
-3.87
1.83
-0.09
4.04
-2.48
-3.18
0.82
1.21
0.06
-2.71
2.76
-2.42
2.04
-4.48
0.72
2.76
3.30
2.85
11.26
6.64
0.03
-2.26
0.86
2.11
1.96
-1.61
-1.27
-0.4
2.69
1.02
-4.47
0.51
-2.93
-1.5
0.62
16.46

Tlnz
0.024***
6.1
Constant
-0.619
-0.05
Panel B
Inefficiency term
Efficiency term
Intercept
-0.542
-0.05
Intercept
13.110***
20.44
lnTA
0.825
0.68
lnTA
0.787**
2.16
Lerner
0.555***
9.99
Lerner
-5.095***
-20.15
HHI
0.063
0.03
HHI
-3.999
-1.36
Listed
0.070**
2.55
Listed
0.280
1.45
SOCB
-0.302***
-3.37
SOCB
1.487***
4.72
JSCB
-0.210***
-5.56
JSCB
0.605***
6.38
CCB
-0.303***
-11.63
CCB
0.485***
3.55
GOVOWN
0.065
1.5
GOVOWN
0.374**
1.99
sigma-squared
1.280
sigma-squared
0.2873
gamma
0.893
gamma
0.941
Notes: Because the original results from the Battese and Coelli’s (1995) model provide the relation between the determinant
factors and cost inefficiency scores, we therefore reverse all signs of the estimates parameters with the determinant variables to
identify effects of these variables on cost efficiency; ***, ** and * indicate the 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.
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